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THE KOCHEN- SPECKER THEOREM IN QUANTUM MECHANICS: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENT (PART 2/ 
Abstract: The text is a continuation of the article of the same name published in 
the previous issue of Philosophical Alternatives. The philosophical interpretations of 
the Kochen- Specker theorem (1967) are considered. Einstein's principle regarding the 
,consubstantiality of inertia and gravity" ( 1918) allows of a parallel between descrip-
tions of a physical micro-entity in relation to the macro-apparatus on the one hand, and 
of physical macro-entities in relation to the astronomical mega-entities on the other. The 
Bohmian interpretation ( 1952) of quantum mechanics proposes that all quantum sys-
tems be interpreted as dissipative ones and that the theorem be thus understood. The 
conclusion is that the continual representation, by force or (gravitational) field between 
parts interacting by means of it, of a system is equivalent to their mutual entanglement 
if representation is discrete. Gravity (force field) and entanglement are two different, 
correspondingly continual and discrete, images of a single common essence. General 
relativity can be interpreted as a superluminal generalization of special relativity. The 
postulate exists of an alleged obligatory difference between a model and reality in sci-
ence and philosophy. It can also be deduced by interpreting a corollary of the theorem. 
On the other hand, quantum mechanics, on the basis of this theorem and of V on Neu-
mann's (1932), introduces the option that a model be entirely identified as the modeled 
reality and, therefore, that absolutely reality be recognized: this is a non-standard hy-
pothesis in the epistemology of science. Thus, the true reality begins to be understood 
mathematically, i.e. in a Pythagorean manner, for its identification with its mathemati-
cal model. A few linked problems are highlighted: the role of the axiom of choice for 
correctly interpreting the theorem; whether the theorem can be considered an axiom; 
whether the theorem can be considered equivalent to the negation of the axiom. 
Key words: Kochen- Specker theorem, relativity, entanglement, model and reality, 
Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics, axiom of choice. 
Pe3JOMe: Pa3rJie)K,[(aT ce <lJHnoco<lJcKH HHTepnperauHH Ha TeopeMm;a Ha KoywbH 
11 lllneKbp (1967). AHmuai1HOBHHT npHHUHn 1a ,e.IU1HOCbll.U1eTO Ha HHepuml 11 rpasH-
Taum~:" (1918) ll03BOJUIBa napaneJIH3bM Ha OllHCaHHeTO Ha <lJ!1311'-!eCKH M11Kp0-06eKT 
CnpHMO MaKpO-ype)J.a, OT e)J.Ha crpaHa, 11 Ha <lJ113HLJ:eCKH MaKp0-06eKTI1 fiO OTHOWeHHe 
Ha acrpOHOMHLJ:eCKH Mera-o6eKTI1. DOMOBaTa HHTepnpeTaUHH (1952) . Ha KBaHTOBaTa 
MeXaHHKa ll03BOJIHBa KBaHTOBHTe CHCTeMH )J.a Ce TbJIKysaT KaTO )J.HCHllaTHBHH 11 Ha Ta-
311 OCHOEa )J.a Ce OCMHCJUI TeOpeMaTa. 3aKJIIOLJ:eHHeTO e: rJia)J.KOTO npe)J.CTaBHHe 4pe3 
CHJia HJIH llOJie Me)K,[(y LJ:aCTHTe Ha CHCTeMa, B3aHMO)J.eHCTBall.U1 CH 4pe3 THX, e eKBHBa-
JieHTHO Ha C)J.BOHBaHe Me)K,[(y THX np11 )J.HCKpeTHO npe)J.CTaBHHe. fpaBHTaUHHTa ( CHJIO-
BOTO fiOJie) 11 C)J.BOHBaHeTO ea )J.Be pa3JIHLJ:HH, CbOTBeTHO rJia)J.bK 11 )J.HCKpeTeH o6pa3 Ha 
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e)J,Ha-e,LU1HCTBeHa 06111a Cbll\HOCT. 06111aTa TeOp11H Ha OTHOCI1TeJIHOCTTa MO)f(e )J,a Ce 
11HTepnpeT11pa KaTO CBpbXCBeTJ111HHOTO 0606llleHI1e Ha Cllel.\11aJIHaTa. B Ha)'KaTa 11 tPI1-
J10COtPI1HTa Cbll\eCTByBa llOCTyJiaTbT 3a np11HI.\11TIHO HeOTCTpaH11MaTa pa3JII1Ka Me)f()J,y 
MO)J,eJI 11 peaJIHOCT. Toi1 MO)f(e )J,a ce H3He)J,e L!pe3 TbJIKyBaHI1e Ha e)J,HO OT cJie)J,CTBI1HTa 
Ha TeopeMaTa. OT )J.pyra CTPaHa, KBaHTOBaTa MexaHHKa - Ha OCHOBaHHe Ha TeopeMaTa, 
KaKTO 11 Ha npe)J,xo)f()J,alllaTa H Ha <PoH Hoi1MaH (1932) - BbBe)f()J,a Bb3MO)f(HOCTTa Ja 
OTb)f()J,eCTBHBaHe Ha MO)J,eJI 11 peaJIHOCT 11 OTTyK: 3a a6COJ1lOTHO TI03HaHHe Ha peaJIHOCT-
Ta OT '!OBeKa: e)J,Ha HeCTaH)J,apTHa XHllOTe3a B eTII1CTeMOJIOri1HTa Ha HayKaTa. 3ae)J,HO C 
TOBa CaMaTa peaJIHOCT He06XO)J,I1MO 3anO'!Ba )J,a ce pa36Hpa KaTO MaTeMaTI1'!eCKa, T.e. 
TIO TII1TaropeHCKH, nopa)J,I1 OTb)f()J,eCTBHBaHeTO H C HeHHI1H MaTeMaTI1'!eCKI1 MO)J,eJI. l1J-
Be)f()J,aT Ce HHKOJIKO CBbp3aHI1 np06JieMa: tPYH)J,aMeHTaJIHaTa Ba)f(HOCT Ha aKC110MaTa 3a 
1136opa np11 11HTepnpeTHpaHe Ha TeopeMaTa; CTaTyCbT Ha TeopeMaTa: Bb3MO)f(H0 J111 e 
)J,a ce 11HTepnpeT11pa KaTo aKCHOMa; )J,aJII1 TeopeMaTa He MO)f(e )J.a ea pa3rJie)f()J,a KaTo 
eKBI1BaJieHTHa Ha OTPI11.\aHHe Ha aKCI10MaTa. 
11. A few philosophical comments about the Kochen- Specker theorem 
If you return to a quantum reading of GR and take into account ,the consubstan-
tiality of inertia and gravity" (Einstein 1918: 241 ), you should mean that not only de-
scriptions by gravitational and any potential field are equivalent to each other 
mathematically (or if we allow ourselves to express so, consubstantial), but from our 
viewpoint the quantum description of the same object to a mega-object is equivalent to 
them, too. Clearly, the theory of representations, offering a mathematical language to 
identify and explain the isomorphism of potential (gravitational) and quantum random-
ness, along with that, guides us to their eventual consubstantiality. If quantum mechan-
ics by '£'-function shares an equivalent discrete description of any potential field, and 
general relativity has already enacted the indistinguishability of arbitrary potential and 
gravitational field, we have no more choice except concluding that '£'-function should 
be an equivalent, but discrete description of gravitational field: For example, then the 
descriptions of the universe by its '£'-function or by metrical tensor in any point of 
space-time are at least isomorphic, and following an Einsteinian kind of Pythagorean 
ontology, one in essence, besides. 
In our physical world a model can be represented by dissipative system from chaos 
theory. By it we could read as the alleged hidden parameter of quantum mechanics any 
,gently swinging the wings of a butterfly" in the appliance that leads to the measured re-
sult about the investigated quantum object in a dissipative, but causal way, anyway. Such 
an approach very reminisces Bohm (Bohm 1952: 17l)'s interpretation. However accord-
ing to Kochen- Specker's theorem and its corollaries a coherent system is impossible to 
be reduced to any de-coherent state. Consequently, dissipation can be accomplished only 
by the system environment or in other words, by the system non-standard, entangled, ex-
ternal parts, i.e. by the device as which all the rest can be considered. If we think of the 
universe as a whole without parts or environment, then all other possible states of itS force 
it to leave the coherent state in favor of the single real state. Who accomplishes a choice? 
According to the axiom of choice a system can make the choice by itself According to 
the Kochen- Specker theorem it is impossible to do that by itself, and the choice is only 
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forced by its environment or by its possible states. Therefore we should again speak of a 
Skolemian type of the relativity of freedom and necessity, this time. 
Our central interest is the pending identification of the alleged superluminal 
area of SR (the tachyons theory) with GR on the base of the already proposed identifi-
cation of any potential field (GR), but also with one-to-one discrete morphism, and 
hence with a certain superluminal speed transferring us into the real domain of 
Minkowski space (SR). 
The idea of interpreting GR as the ,theory of tachyons", i.e. as the superluminal 
generalization of SR, is not only quite new and unexpected, but suggests even having to 
be particularly highlighted. The reasons are several: 
Even the very name and the intention of general relativity suggest that it to be in-
terpreted as a generalization of SR as to non-inertial (or arbitrary) reference frame . 
Along with that the quoted already many times principle of Einstein's relativity (1918: 
241) constrains all physical movement to diffeomorphisms, so that non-inertial systems 
which are obtained from one another by a discrete (quantum) leap are not considered. 
Just because of that the idea of a possible generalization of the principle or theory of 
relativity as well regarding such a kind of reference frame is able to be suggested. Fur-
thermore, it seems that the notion of relative speed cannot be defined in a nontrivial 
way since it is always infinite, and besides, violates the principle of no exceeding the 
light sped in free space, correspondingly, Lorentz invariance. 
It is useful to emphasize a relationship with the representation theorem (Riesz 
1907) to try to clarify how the already sketched identification of GR with the superlu-
minal extension of SR (the theory of tachyons), first, is easy to be transferred as iso-
morphism between pseudo-Riemannian and Minkowski space, and secondly, gains 
some redundancy of the thought of ,curved" Hilbert space, since that isomorphism can 
be conducted, namely by the Riesz theorem, also between usual standard and alleged 
, curved" Hilbert space. 
Suffice it to introduce the concept of covariant world line matching the usual con-
travariant one if and only if the curvature of pseudo-Riernannian space in any point of the 
world line is zero. Obviously, the condition is met for each world line in Minkowski space. 
If you introduce a more natural and reasonable, and one can say, and traditional 
principle of invariance of physical laws in the transition from quantum micro-object to 
measuring instrument (in particular, it implies the mega-interpretation of quantum me-
chanics), which establishes the equivalence of any usual continual and a new, discrete 
description of the surrounding macro-physical reality in relation to mega, i.e. universe 
objects. Its relativity affects the equivalence as of the relation of micro and macro and 
of macro and mega as of the relation of discrete and continuous models. 
This approach is similar to that of Schrodinger: lf'-function to be interpreted as a 
,list of expectation" (Schrodinger 1935: 827-828), i.e. as a ,description" . He also dis-
cussed it as , reality", therefore in an epistemological sense, which is opposite. There is 
more information in the world line than in the lf'- function and it should regard as real-
ity from this perspective. From the other hand, we cannot recover the real world line 
from all the set of experiments, as we have not any empirical or experimental access the 
alleged hidden parameter, which we could call the moment of projection and which ap-
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pears to be due to an uncontrollably random superposition of a large number of contrib-
uting factors associated with macro-measuring: if we did so, we would be near to Bohm 
(Bohm 1952, 1: 17l)'s position. 
There is always a morphism, whose physical interpretation is the time reversion, swap-
ping places of calculation and meta-calculation, or respectively, of the eo- and contra variant 
world line as well as, of the set of all subset of a given one and it itself, which is rather 
unexpectedly. That will be allowed only if any set is always a set of subsets of another. 
The conclusion is: The continual representation by force or (gravitational) field 
between parts, interacting by means of it, of a system is equivalent to entanglement be-
tween them if representation is discrete. Gravity (force field) and entanglement are two 
different, correspondingly continual and discrete, images of a single common essence. 
Here we encounter a Skolemian type of relativity between discrete and continual 
models, between a system as an indivisible whole and as an ensemble or even sum of its 
components, between entanglement and (incl. gravitational) forces. On the pole of 
philosophical reflection, continual and discrete, countable and countless, ,curved" and 
,flat", physical, logical and mathematical, material and algorithmic, holistic and calcu-
late models proved to be really united, but splitting up into these polar images, which 
should be different only and seemingly rather only by tradition. It is Hilbert space that 
manages to display that unity. 
Getting once again on a properly philosophical position, we have to raise 
the issue of mapping between description and reality, or on the poles of inevitable 
speculation, between subject and object, in our case: a quantum physical object de-
scribed by '£'-function. For classical philosophy, the description is always different from 
reality, in most cases it is not more than an extremely rude and imperfect copy. 
Is there a mathematical structure to model both an object and its description and 
which can display the relationship of identity between them? Hilbert space matches 
such a type. We could look at world line as an object by itself, and on '£'-function as its 
description. On the one hand, we could add to '£'-function the corresponding hyper-
maximal operator or a set of such ones so as to get the object just as the movement of a 
material point or as the change of the quantities characteristic of it. On the other hand, 
the very '£'-function choses exactly a single world line as the movement of a material 
point and in a sense it is that description which coincides with the object, it is a ,phe-
nomenon". So, in this second case, we deal with the phenomenon of the thing in rela-
tion to the latter. The phenomenon can play the role of logical subject in spite of being 
variable in time and having many physical quantities, which are not phenomena as the 
'£'-function has to be complemented by the corresponding self-adjoint operator charac-
terizing a concrete quantity. However, any quantity can be considered as the substance 
of the thing, and any else as its predication. This allows us to make identification, by 
which to move ourselves to the position of classical ontology and logic, by taking the 
entire class of specific quantities as the very thing, since each one of them can be con-
sidered as that substance - a phenomenon, to which the rest are predications. The pros-
pect of an also Skolemian relativity of phenomenon and object, of individual and class 
is now outlined in front of us. 
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The made just discussion should be generalized. Not only the mechanical move-
ment can be seen in the logical and discursive perspective of description, but con-
versely, any logic of som((thing or a concrete discourse is isomorphic of some mechani-
cal movement and consequently, we can direct to them also from this position, again by 
means of'£'-function, but already discussed as an iterating and iterative set of projective 
operators in the spirit of von Neumann' s classical foundation of quantum logic. 
The notion of time as in physical as in philosophical sense allows us also to corre-
late infinite and finite choice: infinite choice mathematically guaranteed by the axiom 
of choice and embodied in the totality of time usually named eternity, and finite choice 
which is empirically given t-o any human being in present. 
One could formulate the following principle of a rather philosophical nature: de-
scription is not more complex than described (reality), the cardinal of the former is less 
than or equal to that of the latter. Description can be treated as encoding the described, 
and the physical quantity of information as the product of those two factors . 
Along with the above, 'forces in reality' can adequately and equivalently be repre-
sented as the entanglement of descriptions. Jumps, , miracles" from the discrete de-
scription have a parallel continual physical description only within which they are able 
to be thought as physical forces or fields according to the setting or prejudices of mod-
em science. A-causal description by means of feedback from the future is systemati-
cally overlapped by causal one, which has as if the crucial advantage of successful sci-
entific predictions, which do not influence, do not , shift" the future by their very nature. 
The notions of subjective or objective probability allow for us to distinguish corre-
spondingly subjective or objective time being reconstructed on the base of them (e.g. as 
the expectation of a subject or the frequency a given event to occurs) . In both cases, 
time is assumed discrete as it jumps from the present to the fixed future moment when 
the event is going to occur. 
In the case of objective probability interpreted e.g. as frequency, a statistics is 
available as to the realization of the event in many cases: the numbering of the latter 
may be regarded as a parameter or as a name of many parameters. 
The case of subjective probability means a unique event, which rejects the possi-
bility of any hidden parameter because of its indivisibility. An iterative procedure can 
be imagined such that it converges on a hypothetical absolute subject gradually cover-
ing more and more real ones who form a common (to call it ,expert") opinion on the 
probability for the target event to take place in reality. 
We can express the hypothesis that the two limits each tending to infinity corre-
spondingly of individual events or actors will coincide, besides suggesting its funda-
mental, axiomatic character. 
Another option is its negation, namely that there is in general a mismatch between 
the value of the objective and subjective probability, possibly varying from one to another 
event: We will call it ontological difference. Let us emphasize that we define a strictly 
quantitative expression for 'ontological difference' : the difference or the ratio between the 
limits (in infinity) of subjective and objective probability, to which a difference or a ratio 
of the restored to their base discrete (subjective and objective) times will correspond. 
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However, if you stand on the position of a match, therefore continuity between 
subjective and objective time, you could weaken the hypothesis of smooth transition 
between them: It is only the infinite values that have to coincide, but not both first de-
rivatives correspondingly ,on the right" and ,on the left", which both must exist. The 
limits of converging by subjective and by objective probability do not coincide. 
Such an option split the concept of ontological difference by the hypothesis of the 
identity/ non-identity of infinity: we will denote it as ,logical difference", and being 
different from ,ontological difference", it suggests a topic about ,onto-logical differ-
ence", of course, in a partly quantitative and emphasizing its limited aspect. 
But which is the case realized in quantum mechanics if we look at it as a check on 
that: which of the above suggestions as theoretical possibility has taken place in reality? 
There is a statistics (frequency) as in the case of objective probability, but it preclu-
des any hidden parameter, as in that of subjective probability. One (and perhaps the only 
possible) solution is matching the subjective and objective probability, i.e. zero logical 
and 'therefore onto-logical difference. We are going to denote that case as ,quantum 
probability" and understand exactly matching the subjective and objective probability. 
We can add that the concept of probability seen as the ratio of infinites in a finite 
limit allows to clarify how and why its involvement in quantum mechanics gains a de-
finite quantitative expression for any discretization as regards the infinite speeds ob-
tained as a result because of the zero time to perform any quantum leap. While infinity 
is not empirically and therefore experimentally attainable, it is already subjective prob-
ability (of an absolute subject), postulated as coinciding with the objective one and by 
means of it, that is. 
While and if we have assumed that present is before the infinity of past, and that of 
future is after it, we could use the term of ,non-finite" for a similar status after arith-
metization. Non-finite sets are built as follows: that set whose set of subsets is countable 
is non-finite. Present is located in non-finiteness: after any finiteness, but before any 
infinity. It is the relation between non-finiteness and infinity that is represented as prob-
ability and can describe discreteness. 
When we generalize the concept of ,trajectory" from three-dimensional to 
Hilbert space, we replace 'point' (an element of a function) with 'function'. The con-
cept of ,continuous trajectory" must therefore be reviewed. In our examination by 
means of qubits, continuous trajectory refers to all of them and thus is limited to the 
continuous path of points. Furthermore, the change of probability per time unit is di-
rectly interpreted by the quantum of action, i.e. for the values smaller than it. We have 
to pay special attention to the text in italics, because, by the assumed and interpreted 
relationship between energy and probability, we can transform sub-quantum into super-
quantum reality including the macro-world. Roughly speaking, the entire universe can 
look like the inside of one quantum; inversely, the super-quantum area can be consid-
ered as the outside of the universe: It is very interesting that the vicinity of any its inter-
nal point is able to be discussed as its outside. Indeed, Hilbert space interpreted as a 
space of IJ'-functions equivalent to world lines has precisely this property, which can be 
called fractal probably not only metaphorically. Each line describes an eternity of the 
universe as the continuity of past, present and future: note that the description originates 
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from one reference frame. The impossible and self-contradictory external movement of 
the universe is described as the internal one: It is enough to ,change the Gestalt" and 
look at each 'I'-function like a description of the state of the universe and only secon-
darily, and as a result of the former like a description of a physical object inside. The 
universe consists (internally) of its (external) states. The transition from stochastically 
determined chaos to probabilistic quantum states converts its parts into its states. 
Therefore, the Skolemian relativity of continuity and discreteness is easily to be 
transformed into the relativity of externality and internality permitting a single common 
description. Then energy corresponds to the values of change within a quant or a dis-
crete jump. On the other hand, we have used the probabilities for infinity: the probability 
is a bridge, through which we are able to think uniformly as infinitely great as infinitely 
small quantities as infinitesimal, but in terms of discreteness embedded by quantum. 
Since in our approach, action corresponds to the change of probability, the princi-
ple of least action is converted into a principle of least probability change, which is in-
tuitively perfectly acceptable: the transition from one to another '1'-function must take 
place through the least change of probability. In particular, in the case of the transfor-
mation corresponding to a physical quantity (i.e. by a hypermaximal operator), the 
amendment of probability is zero, and we have already noted that all transformation of 
that class may be related to the present of the object possessing that 'I'-function. Time 
can be described as the density of probability for transiting from one to another '1'-
function, in which the former is interpreted as the present of the quantum object in 
question, while the latter as future or past states. The probability density function will 
be maximal in the present, to the maximum of which the past values will grow mono-
tonically by different slope, and those of the future in turn will decrease, forming a typi-
cal bell shaped probability density curve. Negative probability will be then naturally 
interpreted as a probability for converting in past states, i.e. back in time, while the 
complex one will be referred to the time axis distortion. 
The fundamental constants - the Plank one and that of the light speed in vacuum -
are a natural units set allowing the parts of them to be interpreted as probabilities, and 
continuity to be transformed into the internality of a discrete (quantum) jump. 
If we mean to type a summary of the principle of least action, it appears that may 
cover a wider area, namely Hilbert space, and as long as the amendment of the prob-
ability in time is interpreted as the frequency of de Broglie wave. Such an interpretation 
is natural because probability, thought even elementarily, is defined as the ratio of the 
part of the alternatives accepted as favorable (whether in anticipation or as a statistical 
frequency) of a choice towards all of them. Then de Broglie wave corresponds to the 
amendment of the positive alternatives if the set of all the alternatives remains the same 
(in other words, the change of the favorable ones is for the account of the negative 
ones) . Such an approach, besides suggesting an unusual perspective on energy, respec-
tively matter, assumes that the law of energy conservation roughly approximates the 
linear area of increasing (decreasing) the probability of the bell curve of probability 
density distribution, or of the linear change of the positive alternatives. In areas, in 
which such an approximation is s-ignificantly different, forces, fields, and their energies 
should appear to compensate for the inaccuracy of approximation. 
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The principle of least action as a principle of least changing the probability actually 
includes also the case of its amendment in time corresponding to the above introduced 
concept of logical difference. In terms of the alternatives accepted to be favorable of a 
choice, ontological difference is the difference between the amount of favorable and 
unfavorable alternatives and all the alternatives while logical difference is that between 
all the alternatives (e.g. at different points in time). Logical difference, however, should 
be understood sufficiently generally: since all alternatives form a totality, it means that 
we can assume for the difference as preservation as change in an equal degree. There-
fore, the logical difference seeks to quantify the relationship of the totality to itself. 
Finally, the context of the work can be used to address a few - seemingly disparate 
and unrelated- exceptions for the dimensionality of 2 Gleason's (Gleason 1957: 132), 
in Kochen- Specker's theorem (Kochen, Specker 1967: 70; § 6; Specker 1975: 139-
140), and at last ... Ferrnat' s last theorem proven at the end of last century by Andrew 
Wiles. Kochen and Specker directly indicated that the displayed result can be obtained 
from the theorem of Gleason. (Kochen, Specker 1967: 70). However our work has 
grounded on the isomorphism of qubit and three-dimensional sphere (which in fact is 
similar to Kochen and Specker's counter-example of the § 6 of their article), on the rep-
resentation of Hilbert space by qubits and hence, by Minkowski space. Further a sur-
prise occurs: as three-dimensional sphere is obtained from the complex Hilbert space of 
dimension 2, and Minkowski space is an additive combination of qubits, at that repre-
sentable as Hilbert space, then there is a direct pathway the exception about dimension-
ality two to be transferred to infinite dimensions . It should however again be noted that 
this is not a way to carry over to any finite dimensions. Further the axiom of choice car-
ries the outcome to any transfinite power provided it to be valid for that power. We 
have statements- all of those that appear by the exception of dimensionality 2,- which 
are not true for any finite integer, but they are true for an infinite number. The only way 
out of the situation, if we are to preserve the principle of induction, moreover it is in-
cluded in the Peano axiomatic of integers, is to accept that there is a number that we 
cannot point out, for which that type of statements are not valid. The argued could im-
mediately refer to Ferrnat's last theorem if we have taken a sufficiently powerful axiom 
of choice as long as higher dimensions are obtained multiplicatively. Is the axiom of 
choice or weaker version of it (the theorem of prime Boolean ideals) used in Wiles ' 
proof (McLarty 20 I 0) to be displayed that the field of rational numbers has an algebraic 
closure or all fields have algebraic closures Wiles (1995; Taylor, Wiles 1995)? On the 
base of just made considering as well as the whole context of the article we tend to in-
sist on a negative answer: rather Ferrnat's last theorem as in Wiles' proof as at all is 
equivalent to the negation of the axiom of choice or even of a stronger version of it. It 
could display by its eventual deduction from the Kochen- Specker or Gleason theorem. 
Instead, in the spirit of the philosophical nature of this discussion, we rna y propose 
the following problem: whether the propositions valid for any instant of time are valid 
for the eternity, i.e. whether they are tautologies. In statements on eternity, we find our-
selves in an analogue of well-known difficulties on the set of all sets; in the case: the 
alleged validity I invalidity of the claim on all valid claims. Obviously, the proposed 
isomorphism between Minkowski space and Hilbert space and their physical interpreta-
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tion because of the exception of alleged impossibility usual Boolean logic to be embed-
ded (Kochen, Specker 1967: 70; Specker 1975: 139-140) as to dimension 1 or 2 trans-
fers its statements which are valid, i.e. tautological, for any moment of time into , valid 
at all", i.e. valid as to eternity, however even if they are not valid as to any future mo-
ment (but not present one!). The statements about invalidity towards an arbitrary future, 
but not present instant of time turn out to be self-contradictory on the base of the pro-
posed argument. So ,the problem of unobservables" (Feyerabend 1975: 11 0) after in-
terpreting quantum mechanics by means of three-values logic (Reichenbach 1975) re-
veals its self-contradiction. They are statements about unobservables which turn out to 
be contradictory as such ones about future moments in our approach. 
It turns out that the usual binary logic has an unusual privilege with regard to eter-
nity: in a sense it makes or brings an equivalence between present and eternity, inter-
preting eternity by generality quantifier as ,for all presents". 
Finally we will apply the used argument also to the theorem that a field (i .e. multi-
plication is commutative) of dimensionality higher than two does not exist: the principle 
of induction requires such to exists anyway: Of course, it comes to a clean and uncon-
structi ve proof of its existence. 
But later, according to the conventional interpretation of the theorem known as the 
,paradox Banach - Traski" (Banach, Tarski 1924: 244), a qubit is equivalent to two 
ones hence ultimately to Hilbert space as a whole, as a model of the Universum. Ac-
cording to the theorem of Kochen and Specker (more precisely, as its direct conse-
quence) it cannot be represented as a bit. However being valid the axiom of choice, it 
should be able, as well as according the very example (as a counter-example given by 
them in § 6 of their article) . In last analysis, the starting point for their consideration 
may be reduced to a kind of a ,bit": wave-particle duality, or according to the discus-
sion made in this study, the Skolemain or Einsteinian type of relativity between dis-
creteness and continuity. Choice within a relativity is guaranteed, but immaterial. 
Therefore, the primal philosophical choice we have made is between the importance of 
the very choice and the relativity of its alternatives, and hence their immateriality, ulti-
mately, of the very choice. In gnomic words, the being of the world is reduced to a sin-
gle choice (even of the simplest kind, between two equal possibilities, i.e. to a single 
bit). On the other hand, this is trivial because the question might be: is there a world? 
That problem turns out most surprisingly (of course, not to the successors of the anti-
metaphysic trend a la Wittgenstein in the contemporary philosophy) to be immaterial: in 
a Skolemian way, even being and non-being are relative. 
If we pass the route in reverse order, we can create the universe, including gravity, 
the ensemble of all the possible states of it: each of them is simultaneously the actual 
state of some part of it. In other words, we can create the universe as ,consisting only of 
itself', but not limited to acting as one, i.e. a whole, and also of all of its own parts 
equivalent to the states of the whole. 
Summarizing the entire current statement, we can highlight several major problems: 
1. The fundamental importance of the axiom of choice in the discussion of issues 
around the theorem of Kochen and Specker. 
2. The status of the theorem of Koch en and Specker: Is not it an axiom? 
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3. The relationship of the axiom of choice and the theorem of Koch en and Specker: 
whether and how the latter can be seen as a direct negation of the former? 
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